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We cannot know whether Pavlov's dogs can escape from their conditioned 
existence. 
-- Krisis, Manifesto Against Labour 
 
Introduction 
In his interpretation and application of Claude Shannon’s mathematical theory of 
communication, Friedrich Kittler introduces a way to read literature as a 
communication system. 1  Taking a similar approach, I read the circulation of 
capital as a (formal and material) communication process. On the assumption that 
the circuit of capital is a schematic or diagram of a communication process, the 
circulation of capital that Marx describes in Capital Vol. 2 and Grundrisse can be 
understood as a theory of communication.2 What capital communicates is value 
(more precisely surplus value), which can be considered as the “content” of this 
communication.3 
 Kittler argued that “[m]edia determine our situation, which – in spite or 
because of it – deserves a description.”4  What follows is such a description. 
Capital is more than just a concept or abstraction, and despite it being an 
independently acting agent, it must rely on various media for its iterative 
communication process. Marx draws attention to this with the first logistical 
                                                             
1
 Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication 
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Friedrich Kittler, Discourse Networks 
1800/1900 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).  
2
 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 2 (London: Penguin Classics, 1978); Karl Marx, Grundrisse 
(London: Penguin Classics, 1973), 401-423, 516-549, 618-690, 717-735; Vincent 
Manzerolle and Atle Mikkola Kjosen, “The Communication of Capital: Digital Media 
and the Logic of Acceleration,” tripleC 10, no. 2 (2012): 216, 217. Considering that 
this paper views capital’s circulation as a form of communication, it has some clear 
resonances with Nicholas Garnham and Christian Fuchs’ arguments that the circuit of 
capital should be the starting point for a systematic location of media in capitalism, 
and with Jodi Dean’s articulation of “communicative capitalism” and her emphasis on 
the absorption of all media into the cycle of capital accumulation. Nicholas Garnham, 
Capitalism and Communications: Global Culture and the Economics of Information 
(London: Sage, 1990); Christian Fuchs, “Some Theoretical Foundations of Critical 
Media Studies: Reflections on Karl Marx and the Media,” International Journal of 
Communication, no. 3 (2009); Jodi Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies: 
Communicative Capitalism and Left Politics (Durham and London, Duke University 
Press, 2009). 
3
 Marx, Grundrisse, 626.  
4
 Friedrich Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), xxxix. 
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statements in Capital, where he writes that because the commodity is a thing it 
cannot walk to the market on its own; its guardian must lend it feet, and on the 
market his tongue to speak its price. 5  Although commodities still need help 
moving, their guardians’ feet have today been replaced or extended (depending on 
your point of view) by container boxes of intermodal freight and soon in 
intelligent transportation systems; human tongues are extended in universal 
product codes (UPC) and arphids (RFIDs), though they primarily speak to other 
things rather than to human beings.6 This paper, however, will foreground the 
media and mediums formed by economic categories and human beings 
respectively.  
In the theoretical chapter of his lectures on optical media, Kittler argues 
that McLuhan’s approach to media got it wrong. Noting that McLuhan was 
correct in connecting physiology directly with technology, Kittler argues that 
because McLuhan (being a literary critic) “understood more about perception than 
electronics … he attempted to think about technologies in terms of bodies rather 
than the other way around.”7 For Kittler the “unquestioned assumption that the 
subject of all media is naturally the human is methodologically tricky.”8 In his 
communication theory, human beings are components of large-scale information 
systems, on the same level with technology and institutions. Human beings are 
not the subjects of history; they are merely along for the ride as “the nodes and 
operators necessary to keep the process going until the time arrives at which 
media are able to interact and evolve without any human go-between”9  
I agree with Kittler. The subject of the economic communications systems 
represented in the circuit of capital is capital. In Das Kapital, Marx argues that the 
subject in the capitalist mode of production is value-as-capital. Through its self-
valorization, value preserves and expands itself by constantly changing from one 
form into another (M – C – M’). In this process, value is “dominant” and 
“becomes transformed into an automatic subject.” 10  Similarly, in Grundrisse, 
                                                             
5
 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 1 (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), 178, 189.  
6
 This should come as no surprise; commodities speak to each other, not to Men. Marx, 
Capital Vol. 1, 176-177.   
7
 Kittler, Optical Media, (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 29. 
8
 Kittler, Optical Media, 30. 
9
 Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media (Malden, MA and Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2011), 65. At best human beings are “the sex organ[s] of the machine world, as 
the bee of the plant world, enabling it fecundate and to evolve ever new forms.” 
Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London: 
Routledge, 1964), 56. 
10
 Karl Marx, Capital Vol. 1 (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), 255.  
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Marx writes that capital “exists as the subject of circulation.” 11  In its 
communication, capital posits economic categories or “determined economic 
forms” that it must pass through to become capital. People wear these categories 
as “economic character masks” and are therefore their personifications. 12  As 
personified economic categories, individuals must carry out the logic or function 
associated with the economic form, such as buying, selling or valorizing capital. 
Consequently, from the point of view of circulating capital, human beings are its 
mediums of transmission. It therefore makes little sense to let the human take 
center stage in a description of how media determine our situation. This paper 
thus focuses on capital’s media rather than media for human beings. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the roles individual human beings 
play and the functions they carry out in the circulation of capital through the lens 
of the new materialist communication and media theory of Kittler.13 In particular, 
it will explore the connections between Marx’s theory of value and how Kittler’s 
media theory reduces the human’s ontology to the status of components of 
information processing and communication systems in order to set in relief 
Marx’s argument that individuals are personifications of economic categories. 
This paper questions the subjectivity and agency of human beings when they are 
involved in economic activity. With reference to Kittler’s concept of discourse 
network, I consider whether human beings in the communication of capital can be 
treated as programmable human matter.14 By doing so, this paper brings Kittler’s 
project of “driving the spirit out of the humanities” to Marxism by removing the 
human being from its privileged position in Marx’s political economy. 15 
Consequently it examines whether a nonhuman Marxist theory is possible. Such a 
move necessitates taking a strong deterministic stance, adopting the point of view 
of capital, bracketing the social and flogged categories of labour, production and 
class struggle in favour of the value form, circulation and programmability.16 
                                                             
11
 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (London: Penguin Classics, 1973), 620, 746. Although capital 
is a subject, it is one that lacks consciousness and can be compared to the deity 
Azathoth from H. P. Lovecraft’s mythos. This elder god, living at the centre of the 
universe and referred to as the Blind Idiot God, is said to be completely indifferent to 
the cosmos and not be aware of its own existence. 
12
 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 92.  
13
 Kittler, Discourse Networks; Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter; Kittler, Optical 
Media; Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media; Jussi Parikka, What is Media 
Archaeology? (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012). 
14
 Kittler, Discourse Networks; Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media. 
15
 See, Friedrich Kittler, ed., Austreibung des Geistes aus den Geisteswissenschaften: 
Programme des Poststrukuralismus (München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1980). 
16
 I leave it up to the reader whether this determinism serves as a contribution towards a 
critique of the bourgeois category of “free choice.” 
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Although the former categories are vital to Marx’s theory, this paper, for the sake 
of argument, makes the assumption that production, exploitation and the class 
struggle runs as if on autopilot and thus that capital is accumulated without 
interruption. This line of argument and interpretation is admittedly a selective 
one, but necessary for pursuing the core argument of whether human beings can 
be treated as programmable human matter. By driving out the conscious human 
element, what remains is a description of capital that veers close to a fetishism of 
capital.17 
The argument will proceed as follows: it starts with a discussion of the 
circuit and circulation of capital and argue, drawing on Kittler’s interpretation of 
Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication, that economic categories 
forms the elements of capital as a communications system. The paper then turns 
to Kittler’s concept of the “discourse network” in order to elucidate how human 
behaviour can be understood as a form of programming. After discussing how 
economic categories program individuals’ economic behaviour, the paper relies 
on Jacques Lacan’s concept of “jammed machine” in order to consider how this 
programming can be understood as a limiting of choice. Lastly, the paper 
considers capitalism as an inhuman economy that show no regard for human 
beings and it speculates that humans could be eliminated from the circuit 
altogether.      
 
The Circuit of Capital as Communications Diagram 
Marx describes capital with the formula M – C (Lp+Mp)…P…C’- M’, which 
expresses the identity-in-difference of a universal concept (capital) that 
constitutes itself through a change of particular forms (M, C and P). 18 Figure 1 
                                                             
17
 Considering Kittler’s strong anti-humanist, anti-sociological and anti-economist bias 
and his rejection of grounding technological innovation in socio-economic contexts or 
the desires and intentions of human subjects, the juxtaposition with Marx may seem 
odd. He refers dismissively to the human being and its supposedly unique 
characteristics of consciousness and subjectivity as “so-called Man” and, following 
Foucault, he questions whether there has been, is or ever will be something called 
“Man.” With his disdain for people, Kittler would be a very strange bedfellow for 
Marx who has a strong humanist bias that borders on the vitalistic, and argues that 
labour, alongside creativity, imagination and consciousness are exclusive human 
characteristics. Being a good Feuerbachian, Marx bases his political economy on an 
anthropological critique: the social relationship of human to human is the basic 
principle of critical theory. Marx’s task, which could not be any more different than 
Kittler’s, is to return social phenomena (e.g. religion and economics) to relations 
between humans. Human practice is at the center of Marx’s theory. 
18
 Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 109. 
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represents the circuit of capital as an iterative, circular process in which value 
passes through a sequence of mutually connected metamorphoses of economic 
forms that comprise three stages of a total process. Two of the stages belong to 
the sphere of circulation and one to the sphere of production. In this circulatory 
process value both maintains itself and increases its magnitude, and can repeat the 
process anew after completing all the stages and assuming and discarding the 
forms of money- (M), productive- (P) and commodity-capital (C’) in succession.19 
Capital as a concept is thus the unity-in-process of the stages and particular forms; 
if this unity is not maintained capital is negated and devalued.20 Capital is thus 
perpetually becoming. Movement is life; stasis is death, and ideally capital 
circulates as it does in the mind, at the absolute velocity of speed of thought or 
light.21 Capital is a material process, however. When capital assumes an economic 
form, it must also “invest itself in matter, something that may in fact be resistant 
to it.”22  Capital’s movement (its communication) depends on the economic and 
material form that it assumes, and transmission is always faster than 
transportation. 
                                                             
19
 Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 132-133. 
20
 Marx, Grundrisse, 519, 621; Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 123-124. 
21
 Marx, Grundrisse, 519, 536, 548, 621. The apotheosis of capital’s logic of compulsive 
acceleration is represented in high-frequency trading (HFT), which is the use of 
algorithms to trade securities at time-scales measured in microseconds, and has little to 
do with human action. Donald MacKenzie, “How to Make Money in Microseconds,” 
London Review of Books 33, no 10 (2011); see also Manzerolle and Kjøsen, “The 
Communication of Capital,” 220.  
22
 Christopher John Arthur, “The Fluidity of Capital and the Logic of the Concept,” in 
The Circulation of Capital: Essays on Volume Two of Marx's Capital, ed. Christopher 
John Arthur and Geert Reuten (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), 117. Whether capital 
has the material form of bits or atoms does not, strictly speaking, matter. 
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Figure 1: The circuit of Capital
 
Marx stresses that capital “can only 
a static thing. Those who consider the autonomization of value as mere 
abstraction forget that the movement of industrial
action.” 23  The diagram of capital is thus
operational, physical process that 
media that include human beings, institutions, technical devices and increasingly 
more and more non-human agents. The circuit abstractly describe
movement of capital as matter in various economic guises, that is, the movement, 
at a given speed, of commodities and money through space and time, and their 
connection to the production process. 
of individual capitals” assume the form of supply chains, logistical networks that 
comprise the integration of production, transportation infrastructure and vehicles, 
fiber optics, packages and packets, warehouses and servers and so on. 
Consequently, the diagram of capital is also a topological 
process executed through time and space
of departure and return, these
                                                            
23
 Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 185, emphasis added.
24
 Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 110.
. 
be grasped as a movement, and not as 
 capital is this abstraction in 
 but a static representation of an 
proceeds in space and time by way of various 
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As such, the particular “independent circui
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.
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 Because each form or stage is a point 
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or addresses and temporal waypoints, where circuits of capital intersect, and the 
nodes from where capital relays to value to its next destination.25  
In generalized commodity societies, nobody can consciously regulate the 
distribution of social labour among the various branches of production. This 
distribution is instead regulated by value. In Isaak Illich Rubin’s formulation, 
value functions as “the transmission belt which transfers the movement of 
working processes from one part of society to another, making that society a 
functioning whole.”26 From this point of view, the circuit of social capital can be 
seen as a distributed information processor and coordinator of value. Because 
circuits of capital intertwine and presuppose one another, they process in parallel 
the distribution of labour between the various branches of production. 27  The 
circuit also expresses capital as an articulating force on the time-axes of labour 
and circulation; an articulation of the (cybernetic) control of dead and living 
labour by capital. Consequently, value’s abstractions (i.e. economic forms) 
mediate the reproduction of social life in generalized commodity societies. When 
subsumed into the circuit of capital, the economic forms gain the social form of 
capital and therefore become forms particular to capital.28  
In Grundrisse Marx writes that nothing “can emerge at the end of the 
process which did not appear as a presupposition and precondition at the 
beginning. But, on the other hand, everything also has to come out.”29 A process 
that posits its preconditions as results of its own process is (one of) Marx’s 
definitions of a mode of production, and the transition from one mode to the next 
occurs when a system is able to take pre-existing socio-economic forms and 
reproduce them as the mode’s own conditions.30 Marx bases the logic of capital’s 
                                                             
25
 Marx, Capital Vol. 2, 180. Thus the individual points in Figure 1 can be superimposed 
on a world map: M refers to the location of a company’s HQ; P to the point of 
production; C’ points of exchange/ market places; and the functions M-L and M-Mp 
indicate the existence of labour and other commodity markets, and therefore the 
existence of other independent, individual circuits of capital. 
26
 Isaak Illich Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, (Montreal and New York, NY: 
Black Rose Books, 1973), 81.  
27
 With social capital, Marx refers to the aggregate of all individual and particular circuits 
of capital; the circuit of social capital is thus a universal concept in that it contains in 
itself all its particular manifestations. Thus any particular circuit of capital is a 
representative of social capital. 
28
 Depending on the level of analysis, Marx will refer to economic categories as “forms 
of value,” “economic forms” or "particular forms of capital.” In this paper I use the 
terms more or less interchangeably.  
29
 Marx, Grundrisse, 304. 
30
 Logically and historically, capital’s presuppositions are external: they “come in from 
the outside, out of circulation… hence not emergent from its inner essence;” these 
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reproduction – which is contained in the concept of capital as a circuit, or spiral 
for expanded reproduction – on Hegel’s notion that the category that founds the 
system must also be the one that is demonstrably its final product for the system 
to feed back on itself. 31 Because the “result is already contained in the 
presupposition,” all the economic forms drawn into the circuit of capital represent 
preconditions that are posited results, i.e. abstract points of departure and return 
for turnovers of capital.32  
The capitalist mode of production becomes locked in place as a fixed 
structure as soon as capital relates to itself as capital, that is when “capital itself is 
already presupposed as the condition of its own production.”33 When this occurs 
capital not only presupposes itself, but becomes autonomous, establishes itself as 
something independent from its constituting power: the collective and generic 
forces of human beings.  
Capital can only become an independent process and preserve itself 
through a constant and continual change of forms, from the general to particular. 
The circulation of capital is thus a “series of transformations, in which capital 
posits itself; but, as regards value, circulation does not add to it, but posits it, 
rather, in the form of value.”34 The forms of money (M), commodities (C’) and 
capitalist social relations (Lp and Mp) are “conditions of the production of capital 
itself, in so far as its form as capital is posited only to the extent that it passes 
through them.”35  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
external conditions, however, are subsumed by capital’s process and will consequently 
become “moments of the motion of capital itself, so that it has itself — regardless how 
they may arise historically — pre-posited them as its own moments.” By making the 
presuppositions part of its own movement, capital transforms pre-existing phenomena 
to fit its own purposes. For example, money “makes a transition to capital” by the 
capitalist buying labour-power; after one turnover money “appears as a presupposition 
of capital posited by capital itself.” Marx, Grundrisse, 450; 358. 
31
 The structure of Marx’s dialectical presentation and development of economic 
categories in Das Kapital follows the same logic. It starts with the commodity because 
it is both the presupposition for and demonstrable product of a mature capitalist mode 
of production in which all products of labour must assume that particular socio-
economic form. Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 949. 
32
 Marx, Grundrisse, 307. 
33
 Marx, Grundrisse, 715. 
34
 Marx, Grundrisse, 625-626. 
35
 Marx, Grundrisse, 742. 
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Economic forms as media and elements of a communication system 
How can the economic forms be viewed as media and part of a communication 
system? I first turn to Wolfgang Ernst’s definition of media and then to Kittler’s 
interpretation of Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication. Ernst 
operates with a narrow, channel-centric definition of media; it is the “physical 
passage or place, that mediates something codified and gets decodified at the 
other end.”36 Given the above argument that capital passes through the forms it 
posits, the economic forms can, according to Ernst’s definition, be viewed as 
media. An economic form alone, however, is a category of knowledge, and not 
physical or something that can carry out functions on its own. Given that capital 
invests itself in matter when it assumes an economic form, by virtue of being a 
material object, it occupies a unique place or position in space and therefore can 
serve as a physical passage of value. 
Because capital is actualized and exists materially as supply chains that 
span production and circulation, the physical passage Ernst describes must refer to 
the places where economic forms are gathered, which in the case of the 
commodity means stores, malls and other places of exchange.37 The economic 
forms, however, lack the ability, at least currently, to execute communicative 
economic functions on their own. For this capital relies on mediums: individuals 
to take up position within the categories both internal and external to the circuit. 
Functions of buying and selling are processes of coding and decoding, that is, of 
enabling value to “pass through” the forms that occur during moments of 
exchange. During these moments capital’s media merge with its mediums and 
find union with presupposed and external personified economic categories in a 
particular location in space. To develop this argument in more depth, it is 
necessary to examine what economic categories are in Marx’s system and then 
consider how and why individuals are personifications of them. 
Economic categories are the “theoretical expressions, the abstractions of 
the social relations of production.”38 That is, the categories express productive 
relations (i.e. class relations) between people in the capitalist mode of production. 
Because the relations of production “connect people only through things, the 
things perform a particular social function and acquire a particular social form 
                                                             
36
 Jussi Parikka, “Archival Media Theory: An Introduction to Wolfgang Ernst’s Media 
Archaeology,” in Digital Media and the Archive, by Wolfgang Ernst and ed. Jussi 
Parikka (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 19. 
37
 For the forms of money- and productive capital, the physical passage refers 
respectively to pockets, wallets (analog or digital), safes, mattresses and where bank 
accounts are kept, and to various points of production, such as factories, restaurants 
and offices etc. 
38
 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (New York, NY: Cosimo Inc., 2008), 119. 
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which corresponds to the given type of production relations.”39 The capitalist’s 
status is thus determined by ownership or control over capital, the means of 
production and products of wage-labour; the status of the worker is determined by 
ownership of labour power; and the landlord is determined by ownership of 
land.40 If economic categories are the “bearers” of social relations it also the case 
that the categories “express social functions, or social forms, which are acquired 
by things as intermediaries in social relations among people.”41 In the preface to 
the first edition of Capital, Marx writes: 
To prevent any possible misunderstandings, let me say this. I do 
not by any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in any 
rosy colours. But individuals are dealt with here only in so far as 
they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers of 
particular class-relations and interests. My standpoint… can less 
than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose 
creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may 
subjectively raise himself above them.42  
When referring to the activity of people engaged in exchange, Marx argues that 
the “persons exist for one another merely as representatives and hence owners, of 
commodities” and “in general, that the characters who appear on the economic 
stage are merely personifications of economic relations; it is as the bearers of 
these economic relations that they come into contact with each other.”43 And 
throughout Capital, Marx repeatedly refers to individuals in such a manner, for 
example, as wearing “economic character masks,” playing economic roles, the 
capitalist being a representative of capital, and the worker being “nothing more 
than personified labour time.”44 
What does Marx mean by this description of individuals as personified 
economic categories, which are also attached to things? This is, of course, Marx’s 
theory of the fetish, which reveals that relations between people take the form of 
relations between things; in generalized commodity societies, people “do not 
relate to each other in a direct social way; they first enter into a relationship with 
                                                             
39
 Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 35. 
40
 Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 19.  
41
 Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 35. Indeed, Marx’s system “system 
examines a series of increasingly complex ‘economic forms’ of things or ‘definitions 
of form’ which correspond to a series of increasingly complex production relations 
among people.” Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 37. 
42
 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 92, emphasis added. 
43
 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 178-179. 
44
 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 179, 206; 342, 423, 424, 739; 353. 
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one another during the act of exchange – through the products of their labour.”45 
Things have the social function of connecting people, and from this point of view 
the thing is an intermediary and consequently a bearer of the productive relation.46 
As such, these social relations are naturalized with the effect that “it appears as if 
things have the properties and autonomy of subjects.”47 The implication of this 
argument is that the rationality behind economic activity comes from the things 
(the economic forms) and not from any coherent, unified human subject with 
consciousness and free will. I am, however, getting ahead of myself. Before 
developing this particular argument, I first consider how economic forms can be 
considered elements of the communication system that is capital. I therefore turn 
to Shannon’s theory of communication.  
For Shannon it is not meaning, representation or anything conditioned by 
culture or the social that constitutes media, but is rather the act of transmitting a 
message coded into a signal through a noisy channel. Although Shannon was 
interested in the engineering aspects of technical systems, Warren Weaver argued 
for the theory’s wider applicability, and Kittler, with his concept of discourse 
network and his reading of literature as media, has demonstrated the applicability 
of Shannon’s model to the humanities.48  
                                                             
45
 Michal Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital (New 
York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2012), 73. 
46
 Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, 31. 
47
 Heinrich, An Introduction, 34. 
48
 Shannon's theory of communication bears some superficial resemblance to Stuart Hall's 
“encoding/decoding” model (loosely based on the circuit of capital) that offers a 
theoretical approach to how communication (“messages”) are produced, distributed 
and interpreted. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the intellectual 
history of both Shannon and Hall’s respective models, a comparison of the two can 
help bring out what sort of intervention Kittler did with regards to media theory and 
what this paper’s intervention is in Marxist political economy. Shannon’s diagram of a 
general communications system (see Figure 2) and Hall's “communicative chain” 
appear to be very similar; both have five elements, both uses encoding and decoding of 
a message, and both operate with distortion of the message; through a channel in the 
case of Shannon and the TV-programme in Hall. The similarity, however, is 
superficial and semantic. For Hall encoding yields “messages in the form of a 
meaningful discourse,” which in turn is “meaningfully decoded.” Meaning is irrelevant 
in Shannon’s model, which centers on the engineering problematic of transmitting an 
encoded message through a noisy channel irrespective of whether the content of the 
message is gibberish, a random sequence of numbers or meaningful human discourse. 
In Shannon' model it is assumed that the transmitter and receiver is on the same side or 
co-operate against distortion or interception. Ideally decoding is simply the inverse of 
encoding so that there is a perfect match between message sent and message received. 
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By ignoring “the being for whom the message connotes or denotes 
meaning,” Shannon sought to “clarify the internal mechanism of 
communication.”49 Once the general functions and elements of communication 
are known – data source, sender, channel, receiver and data sink – they can be 
found in any communications system. Weaver gives the following description of 
Shannon's system (see Figure 2): 
The information source, selects a desired message out of a set of 
possible messages (…).... The transmitter changes [encodes] this 
message into the signal which is actually sent over the 
communication channel from the transmitter to the receiver... The 
receiver is a sort of inverse transmitter, changing [decoding] the 
transmitted signal back into a message, and handing this message 
on to the destination.50  
 
Figure 2: Shannon's general communication system.51 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
In Hall, however, encoding/decoding “may not be perfectly symmetrical;” there is an 
“asymmetry between the codes of 'source' and 'receiver' at the moment of 
transformation into and out of the discursive form.” This asymmetry enables resistant 
readings or refusals to accept the message. If resistance or refusal were possible in 
Shannon's theory, communication would be unsuccessful. Shannon, The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication; Stuart Hall, “Encoding/Decoding,” in Culture, Media, 
Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79, ed. Stuart Hall et. al. 
(London, Hutchinson, 1980), 130; 131. 
49
 Kittler, Optical Media, 44. 
50
 Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, 3-4.  
51
 Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication, 7. 
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According to Kittler, information networks can be described only when 
they are contrasted to one another and that this can be done on the elemental level 
of communication. The elements that constitute communication “can be left 
occupied by various agents: by men or women, rhetoricians or writers, 
philosophers or psychoanalysts, universities or technical institutions” because it is 
“completely unimportant what kinds of entities serve as data source that transmits 
a message and data sinks that receive a message, such as humans or gods or 
technical devices.” 52  Regardless of what agents stand in for the elements of 
communication, they all carry out the general functions of communication – 
selecting the message, encoding, transmitting, receiving, decoding and storing.  
Can the circuit of capital, however, be described as an information system 
with reference to Shannon’s five functions and elements? One could say that 
labour-power (Lp), and its dead counterparts (Mp), are the inputs or source; that 
the production process encodes labour into the signal of surplus-value, which is 
output and transmitted through the channel of the sphere of circulation; surplus 
value is then decoded and realized in exchange, and sunk in the storage medium 
of money, which is then fed back into the system as accumulated capital. This 
simple isomorphism, although tempting to commit to, is not sufficient. 
Marx argues that capital is value-in-process. 53  If capital is seen as a 
communication system, it is more precise to say that capital is value-in-
transmission considering that value is the form labour assumes in the capitalist 
mode of production.54 The historical point of departure for the capitalist mode of 
production was primitive accumulation.55 Conceptually we can interpret original 
accumulation as labour being coded as value (“in letters of blood and fire”)56 by 
this extra systemic act of accumulation, and consequently that value can be 
treated as the signal that is transmitted and augmented through the circuit of 
capital. The reproduction of capitalist social relations—the ever-present 
separation of labour power from the means of production as premise and result—
ensures that labour remains coded as value. In the communication of capital, 
                                                             
52
 Kittler, Discourse Networks, 370; Kittler, Optical Media, 44; see also, Tiziana 
Terranova, Network Culture: Politics for the Information Age (London: Pluto Press, 
2004), 15. 
53
 Marx, Grundrisse, 536. 
54
 Karl Marx, “Marx to Kugelmann in Hanover” (1868), Marxist Internet Archive, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1868/letters/68_07_11-abs.htm (accessed 
May 14, 2013). 
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 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 873-876  
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Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 875. 
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value is itself encoded in the particular forms of commodities and money. The 
acts of buying and selling represent the functions of decoding and encoding 
necessary for the signal to reach its destination in money, the independent form of 
value that is always latently capital.57  
The economic categories that are posited by capital are thus analogous to 
the elements of Shannon’s communication model, and the functions associated 
with these economic forms are communicative functions. In the circuit of capital 
the entities that serve as the elements of communication are (a) the determined 
economic forms, (b) the representatives of economic categories and (c) the capital 
subject that, like Moses and the prophets, selects the message to “Accumulate! 
Accumulate!”58 That message can be communicated only if capital keeps (re) 
transmitting the signal of value.59  
 An economic category, however, is empty and therefore non-functional 
unless an individual fills it up, and personifies it by carrying out its particular 
function. While the categories are the elemental forms of media of capital as a 
communication system, individuals are its mediums because they carry out the 
associated function. The economic categories perform functions similar to 
Shannon’s elements, and, importantly, because these categories are products of 
the system and individuals are but representatives of economic categories, the 
output or product of the circuit of capital are subjects programmed to function as 
mediums for the transmission of value. That is, they are the “nodes and operators 
that keep the system going.” 60  To proceed with this argument about 
                                                             
57
 A significant lack to the model just described is noise, which is central to both Shannon 
and Kittler’s respective theories. Does noise impede, slow or interrupt capital’s 
communication, and if so, to what extent? Is the source of noise, from the point of 
view of capital, class struggle or from activities such as auto-reduction and digital 
piracy?  Alternatively, is noise what enables capital to expand its reproduction? In 
other words, does noise enter the sphere of production from the activity of living 
labour? 
58
 “Accumulate! Accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!” Marx, Capital Vol. 1, 
742. 
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 That capital must keep on re-transmitting the message to accumulate rather than being 
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programmable subjects, it is necessary to take a closer look at the connection 
between subjectivity and systems. For this connection I rely on Kittler’s concept 
of discourse network and how human activity is an effect of, and programmed by, 
the wiring of particular discourse networks. 
 
Discourse networks and hermeneutically conditioned subjects 
Kittler relies on Shannon’s model, and seemingly Harold Innis’ understanding of 
culture,61 to develop his concept of discourse network, which designates “the 
network of technologies and institutions that allow a given culture to select, store 
and process relevant data.”62 As such discourse networks are “a set of large-scale 
historically contingent information machines” that “depending on the way the 
data inputs, throughputs and outputs are wired, produces basic notions as to why 
and to what end this machinery is supposed to function.”63 Among the outputs of 
this machinery are subjects and their activity; human beings are compelled to 
participate in, take up position with and act within its parameters and protocols. In 
Kittler’s media theory, human beings are ontologically reduced to components of 
large-scale information systems – be it a discourse network, finite-state automata 
(language) running in our unconscious or, as this paper argues, the circuit of 
capital – on the same level as technology and institutions. Human beings are not 
the subjects of history, rather their subjectivity and activity is posited as functions 
of the system, which is equivalent to a form of programming, in order to maintain 
its continued existence.  
For example, in the 1800 discourse network, people were 
“hermeneutically conditioned” to interpret all signifiers (sounds and words), 
including noise, as filled with or at the threshold of meaning. Kittler bases his 
analysis on an interpretation of Göethe’s poem “Wanderers Nachtlied” 
(“Wanderer’s Nightsong”).64 Kittler is “less interested in what the poem is saying 
                                                                                                                                                                      
machinery… the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages.” Marx, 
Grundrisse, 692. 
61
 Innis provides two very short definitions of the function of culture: (1) “It is designed 
to train the individual to decide how much information he needs and how little he 
needs, to give him some sense of balance and proportion;” (2) “Culture is concerned 
with the capacity of the individual to appraise problems in terms of space and time and 
with enabling him to take the proper steps at the right time.” Harold A. Innis, “A Plea 
for Time,” in Innis, The Bias of Communication, 85. 
62
 Kittler, Discourse Networks, 369. 
63
 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 46; 40. 
64
 Because understanding Kittler’s analysis from Discourse Networks and Dichter, 
Mutter, Kind requires a graduate level knowledge of German literature, I base this 
overview on Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and David E. Wellerby’s interpretations. For 
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than in uncovering the mechanisms that produce meaning in the first place.”65 
This mechanism lies at the center of the 1800 discourse network, which according 
to David Wellerby is the “discursive production of the Mother as the source of 
discursive production.”66 In terms of Shannon’s five functions, the Mother is the 
information source.  
In the age of Göethe, mothers were tasked with “turning raw infant 
material into individuals equipped with a sufficiently developed psychic center of 
resonance and reflexivity, commonly referred to as spirit or soul.”67 Instead of 
putting a baby to sleep with sedatives or narcotics, as had been the norm, mothers 
were told to use their loving voice singing lullabies, and in general and in 
accordance with the new pedagogy of language teaching, to voice what Kittler 
refers to as “minimal signifieds.”68 In German these are represented by sounds 
such as du mu bu be ma am ag ga, which can easily merge into words. For 
example, bu and be result in Bube (little boy) and repeating ma gives Mama.69 
The effortless fusion is based on the assumption that minimal 
signifieds… are always already pregnant with meaning… This 
assumption is reinforced by the new and intimate bond between 
mother and infant, for the latter will perceive the voice of the 
former as always being directed toward something. Together, the 
love of the mother and the semantic plenitude of language 
guarantee that whatever comes out of the mother’s mouth will and 
must be meaningful.70 
Kittler argues that Göethe’s poem is an interpellation: a voice addresses the 
wanderer, and in his analysis, it is the voice of the mother who is “speaking to the 
wanderer of the way in which nature is speaking to him, with the result that the 
wanderer (and his readers) cannot but interpret even the most meaningless noise 
as a meaningful message.” 71  The poem recreates the salient features of the 
mother’s voice and thereby “trigger[s] in the wanderer and, by extension, in 
hermeneutically conditioned readers a response similar to that of an infant 
listening to Hush-a-bye-Baby on the Tree Top.”72 The poem is thus a remediation 
                                                                                                                                                                      
reference, Göethe’s “Wanderer’s Nightsong” is in Appendix 1. Friedrich A. Kittler, 
Dichter, Mutter, Kind (Munich: Fink, 1991).  
65
 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 31. 
66
 David E. Wellerby, “Introduction,” in Kittler, Discourse Networks, xxiii. 
67
 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32. 
68
 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32; Kittler, Discourse Networks, 78. 
69
 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32-33. 
70
 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32-33. 
71
 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 31. 
72
 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 32. 
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of maternal lullabies. Göethe’s wanderer perceives meaningless sounds to be 
“brimming with existential significance” because as an infant and child the 
mother’s minimal signifieds were always on the threshold of meaning.73 In effect, 
mothers equipped their children with a decoder; the poet-philosopher’s cipher that 
transform all noise into meaning. Omnipresent meaning is thus the programmed 
output of the 1800 discourse network (Figure 3) in which the Mother is the source 
of information. She “enters the channel of Poetry as input and, upon exiting the 
other side, is collected in the storage medium of Philosophy.”74 
 
 
Figure 3: Discourse Network 1800. 
 
I present this description of the discourse network with a view to 
considering how we might in turn conceive of economic forms and the individuals 
that fill them as the programmed output of a circuit in which capital is at the 
source of the communication system. In order to continue with the argument we 
need to pay attention to Marx’s intent with his labour theory of value and the 
value form. 
 
IF you inhabit an economic category, THEN execute its logic 
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Michael Heinrich argues that with “value theory Marx seeks to uncover a specific 
social structure that individuals must conform to, regardless of what they think.”75 
Even a class conscious, militant anarchist communist is subject to the commodity 
fetish. All inhabitants of a commodity-producing society are under the control of 
things and, by extension, capital. Value is an impersonal relation of domination 
that acts through “thingified” economic abstractions. That is, this domination 
occurs because “people relate to things in a particular way – as commodities.”76 
Individuals do not interact on the free market as the rational actors of vulgar 
economics’ homo economicus, but rather “they act as executors of constraints 
generated and reproduced by themselves, which are implemented in and through 
their conscious actions without, however, these being consciously accessible to 
them.”77  
With value theory Marx argues that the logic of economic “agents” does 
not come from themselves as coherent, rational subjects, but in general from the 
system of capital and in particular from the economic categories that the system 
posits. Marx refers to this as “economic form determination.” The economic form 
determinants are the “given preconditions for the activity and considerations of 
commodity-owners who then continually reproduce these conditions during their 
activity.”78  As owners of commodities, individuals “must place themselves in 
relation to another as persons whose will resides in those objects.”79 Although 
people engaged in economic activity, such as the exchange of commodities, are 
formally free in their behaviour, “as commodity-owners they must follow the laws 
imposed on them by the nature of commodities.”80 Behaviour on the market can 
consequently be understood as unconscious acts.   
In other words, economic rationality is stored in things and during the 
communication of capital an individual copies and then executes this rationality 
as a communicative function when inhabiting an economic category. Importantly, 
if “their actions correspond to this rationality, then the activity of individuals also 
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reproduce the presupposed social relations.”81 According to Marx, “commodity-
owners think like Faust: ‘In the beginning was the deed.’ They have therefore 
already acted before thinking. The natural laws of the commodity have manifested 
themselves in the natural instinct of the owners of commodities.”82  
Thus the valorization of value is the capitalist's “subjective purpose, and it 
is only in so far as the appropriation of more wealth in the abstract is the sole 
driving force behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital 
personified and endowed with consciousness and will.” 83  In an imaginary 
discussion over the “law of commodity exchange”84 between a capitalist and the 
labour power-owning worker, the latter says: “You may be a model citizen, 
perhaps a member of the R.S.P.C.A., and you may be the odour of sanctity as 
well; but the thing you represent when you come face to face with me has no heart 
in its breast. What seems to throb there is my own heartbeat.”85 The worker makes 
salient the following points: it is living labour that creates value and animates the 
life process of capital. In other words, labour is the use-value of capital. More 
importantly, however, the worker points out that an individual’s personal morals 
or ethics are of no importance because the capitalist is a representative of capital 
and is therefore programmed to follow its logic of ceaseless and limitless 
valorization. That capital compels the capitalist to do (and say) things that he may 
not have done or said if he were not a capitalist, is something that Marx returns to 
over and again in Capital. 
Après moi le deluge! is the watchword of every capitalist and of 
every capitalist nation. Capital therefore takes no account of the 
health and the life of the worker, unless society forces it to do so. 
Its answer to the outcry about the physical and mental degradation, 
the premature death, the torture of over-work, is this: Should that 
pain trouble us, since it increases our pleasure (profit)? But looking 
at these things as a whole, it is evident that this does not depend on 
the will, either good or bad, of the individual capitalist. Under free 
competition, the immanent laws of capitalist production confront 
the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him.86 
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The “laws of capitalist production” manifest themselves in society through 
the “coercive laws of competition,” and these laws “therefore enter into the 
consciousness of the individual capitalist as the motives which drive him 
forward.”87 These laws of capital are independent of the will and volition of all 
individual capitalists. Competition compels capitalists, on pain of ruin, to increase 
productivity, lengthening the workday in order to increase the valorization of 
capital even if they have no interest in doing so at an individual level. New 
methods of production that enable and compel a capitalist to sell his commodities 
for less than their current social value forces his competitors to adopt the same 
method because they cannot escape the law of determination of value by labour 
time.88 The capitalist’s motivating force is thus “an effect of a social mechanism 
in which he is merely a cog.”89  
Effectively, the capital subject programs individuals according to the 
economic form determinants to ensure the transmission of value through the 
circuit of capital. This programming can be considered as a limiting of an 
individual’s choice, which I will argue with reference to Jacques Lacan’s concept 
of the “jammed machine.”90 In order to get to this concept and proceed with the 
argument, however, we have to return to Kittler’s discourse networks where we 
historically left them: right at the point when Mother was replaced as the 
information source of modernity, her removal entailing the end of the 
omnipresence of meaning. In the 1900 discourse network the source of discourse 
is arbitrary; the source is noise and therefore needs institutions of selection, like 
psychoanalysis and psychiatry, to identify human discourse, i.e. to distinguish 
between noise and signal.91  
 
Discourse Network 1900 
In discourse network 1800, all data streams had to go through the bottleneck of 
the symbolic: writing had a monopoly. Reading worked “to raise and cultivate a 
soul, to internalize the fundamental order of culture and nature, and to extend an 
empire of meaning across the expanse of being. To read was to exorcize 
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meaningless noise in favor of omnipresent meaning.” 92  Phenomena such as 
reading, speaking, writing and remembering were subsumed by souls, 
consciousness and subjectivity; they were therefore thought unique to human 
beings. 93  Kittler identifies Hegel as one of the main culprits of such 
subsumptions; he “summed up the perfect alphabetism of his age, he called it 
Spirit.” 94  One of the main outputs of the materiality of the dominant media 
technology of the 1800 discourse network was “the individual, conscious thinking 
subject that produces the world through mental activity.”95 The introduction of 
technological media, or more precisely pathological senses as objects of science, 
thematizes and separates writing into acoustic, optical and symbolic data streams. 
This technological differentiation explodes Gutenberg’s writing monopoly, and 
consequently the uniqueness and internal coherence of human beings must be 
questioned. Man’s  
essence escapes into apparatuses. Machines take over functions of 
the central nervous system, and no longer, as in times past, merely 
those of muscles. … When it comes to inventing phonography and 
cinema, the age-old dreams of humankind are no longer sufficient. 
The physiology of eyes, ears, and brains have to become objects of 
scientific research. For mechanized writing to be optimized, one 
can no longer dream of writing as the expression of individuals or 
the trace of bodies. The very forms, differences, and frequencies of 
its letters have to be reduced to formulas. So-called Man is split up 
into physiology and information technology.96  
 
Kittler argues that Freud’s talking cure revealed language as data stream; 
one that operates according to its own set of rules, which can be recorded.97 
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Freud’s intervention reverses the relationship between language and speaker: we 
are secondary to language; it speaks us rather than the other way around. The 
typewriter, because it “provides writing as a selection from the finite and arranged 
stock of its keyboard” forces humans to change their position “from the agency of 
writing to an inscription surface.” 98  The typewriter therefore “designates the 
turning point at which communications technologies can no longer be related 
back to humans.” 99  When information can no longer be mistaken for spirit, 
“[t]hought is replaced by a Boolean algebra, and consciousness by the 
unconscious, which (at least since Lacan’s reading) makes of Poe’s ‘Purloined 
Letter’ a Markoff Chain.”100 
Lacan’s reading of Poe was indebted to his encounter with cybernetics, 
which for him revealed that symbolic processes are autonomous; language speaks 
us because it is essentially a machine, specifically a finite state automaton running 
in the unconscious.101 With reference to Boolean logic gates, Lacan noted that 
cybernetics introduces “machines which calculate all by themselves” and then 
argues that while we are aware that these machines do not think since they have 
been told (programmed) what to think, this does not reveal any superiority of man 
over machine.102 Rather, “if the machine doesn’t think, it is obvious that we don’t 
think either when we are performing an operation. We follow the same 
procedures as the machine.”103  
Shannon had proved how “statistical properties of any natural written 
language can be computed in terms of transition probabilities between its 
symbols… the probability of any symbol following any other.”104 In English, “the 
probability is actually zero that an initial j be followed by the letters b, c, d, f, g, j, 
k, l, q, r, t, v, w, x, or z.”105 This stochastic process, known as a discrete Markoff 
process determines the output of speakers and writers. Bernd Frohmann argues 
that as 
writers produce strings of letters that constitute English words, 
their writing down of thoughts is machinic insofar as the transition 
from letter to letter is a discrete Markov process. Whether using 
quill pen, typewriter, or computer keyboard, the writers function as 
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machinic writing apparatuses, without any consciousness of the 
probability distributions governing their writing.106 
 
The abstraction of labour perpetrated by individual buyers and sellers can 
be compared to the writer determined by a Markoff-chain. This abstraction is not 
a conscious process, but takes place tacitly: “value… is constituted 
unconsciously: the act of equating takes place in a manner which remains obscure 
to the participants themselves.”107 Because value is a social characteristic, it is 
supersensible, but it nevertheless appears as a tangible characteristic of the thing. 
During the moment of exchange we can only perceive the sensuous object, i.e. the 
commodity’s use value that confronts the money in our pockets or the databases 
of banks. Although the abstraction of labour is an action that takes place in the 
mind, it does not occur consciously. Hence, the abstraction carried out in the 
moment of exchange is not a mental abstraction, but rather a “real abstraction” by 
way of the behaviour of human beings irrespective of their awareness of it. 
With a finite state automaton operating in our unconscious, the 
“movement of a symbol dictates the correlation between a place in a structure and 
a state of the subject.”108  In such a structure, all that a human being really can do 
is to “take up position.” Subjectivity therefore becomes “a matter of subject 
position, of where the subject finds himself or herself in a predetermined 
structure.”109 As an expression of the equal social validity of two qualitatively 
different acts of labour (crystallized in their commodity forms), value represents a 
specific social relationship. The particular forms capital clothes itself in thus 
express the particular content of productive relationships and dictates the position 
and function within capital’s circular structure. The following quote from Capital 
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Vol. 1 helps to illustrate how individuals take up position in circuit of capital. 
Marx argues that by 
taking part in the act of sale, the commodity-owner becomes a 
seller; in the act of purchase he becomes a buyer. Being a seller 
and being a buyer are… not fixed roles, but constantly attach 
themselves to different persons in the course of the circulation of 
commodities. The complete metamorphosis of a commodity, in its 
simplest form [C-M-C], implies… three dramatis personae. First a 
commodity comes face to face with money… A commodity-owner 
is thus confronted with a money-owner… Money, the final stage of 
the first transformation, is at the same time the starting point for 
the second. The person who is a seller in the first transaction thus 
becomes a buyer in the second, in which a third commodity-owner 
comes to meet him as a seller.110  
Only commodities and money have faces; individuals wear them as masks and 
their physiognomy changes, though only temporarily, according to the economic 
form they are positioned within. Having carried out the determined economic 
function, the individual leaves the particular subject position, but is then ready to 
take up position again. In the sphere of circulation, the subject forms posited by 
the circuit of capital can broadly be divided into commodity-owners/sellers and 
money-owners/buyers; when entering the sphere of production, “a certain change 
takes place, or so it appears, in the physiognomy of our dramatis personae. He 
who was previously the money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the 
possessor of labour-power follows as his worker.” 111  Figure 4 shows the 
presupposed economic roles divided into internal and external positions by 
economic functions of buying and selling, and Figure 5 depicts the physiognomic 
changes of an individual whose only property is labour-power.  
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 Figure 4: Economic roles and 
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Figure 5: Subject positions for
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an individual assumes when carrying out economic functions. The particular 
uniqueness of an individual human being is immaterial; what matters is that 
individuals take up position within economic categories and execute its function. 
Any individual can thus stand in for any other individual in Marx’s presentation; 
all that matters is that “they reproduce the preconditioned economic-form 
determinant” in order for capital to assume its next form thus guaranteeing 
capital’s movement.115 
 
Jammed Machines 
By taking up positions within the structure of capital’s circuit, individual human 
beings are programmed in the sense that their freedom of choice is limited, which 
Jappe’s straightjacket comment indicates. As we will see below, with regards to 
communication this limitation is not a bad thing; it is necessary for effective 
communication. Collectively, the economic form determinants can consequently 
be understood as a jamming mechanism that temporarily fixes the individual to 
make a specific pre-determined selection. That is, by taking up position within an 
economic form, the human becomes more jammed than it already is. According to 
Lacan, the        
animal is a jammed machine. It’s a machine with certain 
parameters that are no longer capable of variation. And why? 
Because the external environment determines the animal, and turns 
it into a fixed type. It is in as much as, compared to the animal, we 
are machines, that is to say something decomposed, that we 
possess greater freedom, in the sense in which freedom means the 
multiplicity of possible choices.116  
Lacan operates with an information theoretic definition of freedom or agency; the 
measure of agency is information. And information is the measure of the 
probability of the occurrence of an event and a single selection from a set of 
possible states.117 In other words, it is a measure of uncertainty, i.e. “a measure of 
what the person receiving the message does not know about it before it 
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arrives.”118 The more freedom of choice in selecting the message, the greater is 
the uncertainty and the more information is contained in the system.119 Lacan is 
interested in such a definition of agency considering he argues that the 
unconscious is structured like a language and he is, in part, interested in the 
unfreedom in selecting what to say, such as occurs with a Freudian slip. But what 
does Lacan mean by saying that compared to the animal we are like machines 
because we have a greater degree of freedom of choice? Let us first take a detour 
through Kittler on machine subjects, before returning to the difference between 
animal, man and machine with reference to Marx’s discussion on labour in the 
1844 Manuscripts.120 
According to Kittler machines became subjects in 1938 when Konrad 
Zuse invented the conditional jump. “Computers operating on IF-THEN 
commands are machine subjects” because through conditional jumps a program is 
able to determine its future through successive commands, i.e. choices, after the 
IF condition is met; IF-THEN thus refers to the “discourse of the other”.121 Not 
surprisingly Kittler argues that “both people and computers are ‘subject to the 
appeal of the signifier’; that is, they are both run by programs.”122 Without a 
conditional jump, the machine would be a fixed type, like the animal, because 
without the IF condition it would not be able to make choices based on changes to 
its environment that otherwise would have triggered a jump. What about the 
difference between animals and human machines? 
As Lacan argues, it is the external environment that “jams” the animal and 
turns it into a fixed type. The implication is that the human being has been “freed” 
from its environment. In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx writes: 
Admittedly animals also produce. They build themselves nests, 
dwellings, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But an animal only 
produces what it immediately needs for itself and its young. It 
produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces 
only under the dominion of immediate physical need, while man 
produces even when he is free from physical need and only truly 
produces in freedom therefrom.123  
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The human being has greater freedom of choice in what to produce since it, 
compared to the animal, produces universally rather than one-sidedly. With 
“universal,” Marx means “an individual object which in itself includes all real 
existing types of the same object… for example animal.”124 A particular object is 
not subsumed by a universal, but is included in it; universal refers to both 
abstraction and totality.125 Thus the human being – as an individual of Homo 
sapiens – is freer than the animal because it can choose from all possibilities of 
production rather than being determined by its environment and “life-activity.” 
Life-activity is productive life and appears to the human being as a means of 
satisfying needs. What distinguishes human life-activity from the animal’s is that 
the former can take its life-activity as an “object of will and consciousness,” 
whereas the animal is “immediately identical with its life activity. It does not 
distinguish itself from it. It is its life-activity.” 126  Free, conscious activity is 
humankind’s life-activity, but cannot occur when the “pure expenditure of labour 
power has been raised to an abstract principle.” 127  In the capitalist mode of 
production, workers are identical with wage-labour, i.e. their perverted life-
activity. Thus the commodity-owning worker, in possession of nothing but their 
capacity to labour, is a jammed machine; jammed by capitalist social relations. 
These social relations, in which the proletarian is separated from the means of 
production, limits the choices an individual has in deciding how to acquire the 
means of subsistence, i.e. how to reproduce their life.128   
According to Lacan human beings are “jammed, sucked in by the image” 
and therefore the “subject is no one;” it is “decomposed, in pieces” and can only 
find its “unity in the image of the other,” for our purposes, in commodity 
exchange.129 Although we do not turn into fixed types, for occupying an economic 
category is fleeting, we are temporarily fixed towards a certain choice of action: 
jammed into either buying or selling depending on your position and fixity as a 
commodity or money-owner. In exchange, the “image of the other” is the 
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commodity standing in the equivalent form.130 The individual finds temporary 
unity as a subject with another individual occupying an antithetical position, 
because when two commodities are confronted with one another they temporarily 
sublate the internal contradiction of the commodity in exchange value by carrying 
out the real abstraction of labour.131 The subject finds unity in exchange because 
the subject does not exist for anything but for the purpose of ensuring capital’s 
communication. 
According to Tiziana Terranova, in Shannon’s model the conceptual 
“problem of communication is reduced to that of establishing a bridge or contact 
between a sender and a receiver. The two extremities of the channel ‘are on the 
same side, tied together by mutual interest: they battle together against noise.’”132 
When it comes to the communication of capital, all individuals are on the same 
side as the capital subject because during the moment of exchange they are for all 
intents and purposes tied together by mutual interest; both social individuals and 
social capital must reproduce their life process and this reproduction occurs in 
part through commodity-exchange. This mutual interest, however, is perverse 
considering it derives from an antagonism founded on capital’s original 
accumulation. 
The mutual interest between capital and human individuals is established 
by the former jamming the latter, i.e. by reducing the possible choices the 
individual can make. Because information is a measure of uncertainty, an 
implication of uncertainty is that “[c]ommunication is the extent a sender is able 
to limit the receiver's choices, and information is the extent a receiver knows the 
senders choices.” 133  Through its particular forms capital is able to limit the 
choices of the individuals that take up positions within them. This limitation is 
expressed as a lack of choice in what economic-communicative function is 
executed. Although capitalism appears as an immense collection of commodities, 
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which leads to the belief that the individual has a large degree of freedom of 
choice, this is mere appearance and hides the chronic unfreedom and utter 
predictability of the capitalist economic system as such.134 Because all products of 
labour are commodities and their production occurs under capitalist social 
relations, the means of subsistence must be acquired in commodity form and 
therefore be bought. On the market this social relationship manifests as the choice 
of either buying or selling, depending on what commodity you possess. From the 
point of view of social capital all commodities are pseudo-individualized; activity 
on the market place is conducted under a “halo of free choice.”135 It turns out that 
social capital – the automatic subject of value – is very effective at 
communication because it is “able to limit the receiver’s choices” and therefore 
predict what an individual will do during the moment of exchange. In the 
communication of capital, there are no human beings, only programmable human 
matter. 
With reference to logistics, the communication of capital is thus about the 
co-ordination or scheduling of individuals (capital’s mediums) and fetishized 
economic forms that are attached to things (capital’s media) in a particular point 
in space and time. In this sense we can understand that the movement of capital, 
to paraphrase Johnston, (a) dictates the correlation between a place in the circuit 
of capital, (b) a state (subject form) of the individual and (c) what economic 
function must be carried out.  
Noting that humans have a command of free will (just like cruise 
missiles), Kittler argues that with the emergence of computational media 
“programmability replaces free will.” 136  In the history of hitherto existing 
societies there has never been free will, only human matter programmed to 
believe they possess it. Humans, just like Pavlov’s dog and cruise missiles, are 
programmed to think and act in very specific ways. Revealing the 
programmability of seemingly free agents is the benefit of conceptualizing the 
circulation of capital as a communications system and accepting the post-
structuralist primacy of systems over subjects. Subjectivity is thus like a program, 
which is executed when we take up positions within fetishized economic 
categories. Individuals are therefore capital’s mediums; programmable human 
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matter, which is the perfect complement to the “human resources” found in 
production. Capital may need us now as mediums to course through, but human 
material may be replaced by other materials. We are part of the diagram of capital 
now only because we were part of its historical development, one of the 
preconditions that has been absorbed and made to proceed from it, but it is 
conceivable that we will be eliminated from the circuit altogether. 
 
An Inhuman Economy 
According to Kittler, the ultimate subject of history is technology, which he 
understands in a broad sense as “the processing of nature.” This processing was 
once dependent on human beings as intermediaries, but since the advent of digital 
technology humans are left behind and we are coming progressively closer to a 
self-processing of nature.137 Thus while there was a need for subjects “at one 
point in the long history in the encounter between media and bodies” they are no 
longer needed once machines can read, write, process, transmit and store without 
human input. In a time when computers write themselves and machine-to-
machine communication will soon dwarf human-to-human communication, 
“biological prostheses become obsolete” because computers “optimize certain 
patterns of information processing that were also imposed on human beings and 
that subsequently were mistaken for innately human qualities.” 138  Kittler’s 
reading of literature as media and his focus on systems over subject, specifically 
with the concept of discourse network, reveal that subjectivity was nothing but 
programmability. Winthrop-Young summarizes this pithily: “Where subjects 
were, there programs shall be – because programs were there in the first place.”139 
As such, “each subject is thus an unfree appendage of an undecipherable social 
autonomization that the subjects themselves produce and reproduce but which 
turns against them.”140 The political implication, according to the Wertkritiker, is 
therefore that the subject is “that from which we must be emancipated, and not 
that through which in terms of which we must be emancipated.”141  
  If human beings are not subjects, then what is the subject in Marx’s 
political economy? We have now come full circuit; back to the communicating 
subject called capital. The basic thought of Marx is that human beings confront 
their collective, generic forces for creation as an autonomous, alien deity. The 
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culmination of this argument is the “conception of the autonomous totality of 
social capital as a real total subject, which abstracts itself from the weal and woe 
of individual subjects and is ‘indifferent’ to them.”142 
In the 1844 Manuscripts Marx argues that the economy is under the sway 
of an “inhuman power” and in Capital Vol. 1, Marx argues that value is 
indifferent to use value.143 Although value relies on use value to be realized, it is 
of no importance what that particular use value is as long as someone will buy it. 
As Krisis writes in its provocative “Manifesto Against Labour:” 
[I]t doesn’t matter what is being produced as well as what use is 
made of it – not to mention the indifference to social and 
environmental consequences. Whether houses are built or 
landmines are produced, whether books are printed or genetically 
modified tomatoes are grown, whether people fall sick as a result, 
whether the air gets polluted or ‘only’ good taste goes to the dogs – 
all this is irrelevant as long as, whatever it takes, commodities can 
be transformed into money and money into fresh labour. The fact 
that any commodity demands a concrete use, and should it be a 
destructive one, has no relevance for the economic rationality for 
which the product is nothing but a carrier of once expended labour, 
or ‘dead labour.’144 
In other words, the inhuman, alien power of the capital subject is indifferent to 
human beings and their needs. The object, the particular use value is “dragged 
along” by value, and it must persist so that the “’independent value does not 
collapse into itself’ and so that the production of value in objective form does not 
lose its secure basis.” 145  Capitalist commodity production was never directly 
geared towards the satisfaction of needs, but always towards the ceaseless and 
unlimited valorization of value. If any human needs are satisfied in the process, it 
is only a by-product of the real aim of capitalist production, which is surplus 
value. Use value is only necessary in so far as it aids value in its movement, 
transformation and self-augmentation; it is merely an interface between the 
inhuman life of capital and human social life. And as all interfaces do, they trick 
us into believing that the system is about us. Kittler introduces us to the 
inhumanity of the technological systems we inhabit. He observes that the internet 
is a point-to-point transmission system that copies “almost infallibly not from 
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men to men, but, quite the contrary, from machine to machine.”146 With similar 
intent, Bernhard Siegert argues that the 
more optimal that codes, connections, and transmissions become, 
the more they distance themselves from humans and their 
redundant languages. If a computer system were not surrounded by 
an environment of everyday languages, there thus would be no 
software. User interfaces alone provide humans with the 
narcissistic belief that everything that goes on is being delivered to 
them.147  
In the limitless dynamic of capital as self-valorizing value, all that matters is that 
value is transmitted through the circuit and capital is accumulated. Hence, let us 
drop any foolish notions that an economy based on generalized commodity 
exchange is for, let alone beneficial to, human beings or, for that matter, the 
environment.  Après moi le deluge! It therefore makes sense to bracket the social 
and such notions as class struggle, exploitation and labour, and assume, quite 
deterministically, that capital’s accumulation runs on autopilot. 
 If capital accumulation does run on autopilot, class struggle does not fulfill 
its negative potential, and the human being is not just pushed to the side of 
production, but pushed to the side of the economy as such, how would that affect 
human beings? If capitalism is about unemployment as Frederic Jameson argues, 
there would be a progressive rise in the surplus population that would at some 
point, from the point of view of capital, become an unnecessary overstock of 
human material that at some point will be discarded or destroyed.148 Such a world 
would bear a striking resemblance to the one described in F. T. Marinetti’s 
futurist visionary hypothesis of “Electric War,” but with the human engineers in 
the vision removed altogether and replaced with non-human matter.149 Beyond the 
technological singularity, a capitalism without human beings may very well look 
like something out of Charles Stross’ Accelerando or Saturn’s Children in which 
humanity has been expelled from the solar system by a capitalism run amok or 
gone extinct, but survived by their artificial progeny.150 
                                                             
146
 Friedrich Kittler, “Universities: Wet, Hard, Soft and Harder,” Critical Inquiry 31, no. 
1 (2004):252. 
147
 Bernhard Siegert, Relays: Literature as an Epoch of the Postal System (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 263. 
148
 Frederic Jameson, Representing Capital: A Reading of Volume 1 (London and New 
York: Verso Books, 2011), 2. 
149
 F. T. Marinetti, “Electric War: A Futurist Visionary Hypothesis,” in F. T. Marinetti, 
Critical Writings (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006). 
150
 Charles Stross, Accelerando (London: Ace Books, 2006); Charles Stross, Saturn’s 
Children (London: Ace Books, 2008). Ray Kurzweil defines the singularity in terms of 
Kjøsen / Human Material, Communication and Capital
communication+1 Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Article 3
34
  
 
Postscript 
The preceding has been a description of how media determine our situation. 
When referring to the systems of communication that is the circuit of capital, it is 
more precisely the economic forms that determine our situation and deserve a 
description. This description does not need to include human beings, articulating 
instead the forms they personify. At present, the circulation of capital requires 
human matter to facilitate its movement and self-valorization, but non-humans, 
such as machines, robots, androids and software bots, can arguably play that same 
role.151 A human focus or centering is not required.152 By bracketing the social in 
favour of a determinism of capital, it is possible to read the circulation of capital 
as a physical process subject to the laws of thermodynamics, gravity and nation-
states, but not human will. The question then becomes whether non-humans can 
play a similar role in production.  
The capitalist economy represents a totality of social relations of 
production (social forms) and forces of production (material-technological). From 
the point of view of Marxist political economy, Kittler’s brand of new 
materialism could be said to belong to the latter category, though one in which 
some of the forces of production are post-human agents. Machines “take on 
tasks—drawing, writing, seeing, hearing, word processing, memory, and even 
knowing—that once were thought unique to human and often perform them 
better.” 153  What is thought unique to human beings in Marx’s theoretical 
framework is to labour. To possibly merge the technical with the social thus 
hinges on whether non-humans, such as androids, robots and software bots can 
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consciously and purposively labour and therefore create surplus value. The 
orthodox answer to the question of “Do androids dream of surplus value?” is “no” 
because “they are values already.”154 Artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life 
forms—although these sciences are still in its infancy and it is questionable 
whether AI will ever achieve the flexibility and generality of human 
intelligence—do pose a challenge to Marx’s exclusively anthropological value 
theory. The question must then be answered by considering under what conditions 
(science fictional or otherwise) non-humans could potentially labour and create 
value. Such a discussion would return to the central Marxist categories, such as 
exploitation and class struggle, which have been bracketed in this paper.155 
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Appendix 1: Göethe’s Wanderers Nachtlied/ Wanderer’s Nightsong 
 
Über allen Gipfeln 
Ist Ruh, 
In allen Wipfeln 
Spürest du 
Kaum einen Hauch; 
Die Vögelein schweigen im Walde. 
Warte nur, balde 
Ruhest du auch. 
 
 
Above all summits 
it is calm. 
In all the tree-tops 
you feel 
scarcely a breath; 
The birds in the forest are silent, 
just wait, soon 
you will rest as well! 
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